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Reputation and pricing strategies in online market
Min Xu*, Qiang Ye
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, 150001, China
Abstract:Although pricing strategy in marketing is a crucial issue, there islittle literatureon the relationship between pricing
and sellers’ reputation based on dynamic pricing data. Using data on Taobao.com, we compare pricing behaviors of two types
of sellers, business sellers (T-Mall sellers) which have higher reputation and individual sellers (Tao sellers) which have
relatively lower reputation. We findthat sellers with different reputation levels will choose different pricing strategies and
high-reputation sellers will have advantages in pricing. More specifically, our results reveal thatwhen a T-Mall seller enters
into a market as a new extant it will be more likely to sethigher initial price than a Tao seller. In addition the magnitudes of
price adjustments of Tao sellers have significant correlation with price changes in T-Mall market.On contrary, prices changes
of T-mall sellers are not influenced by price changes in Tao market.
Keywords: reputation, pricing strategy, price adjustment, premium price
1. INTRODUCTION
Pricing, without doubt, is a crucialissuein both traditional and online marketplaces.As a key element of
marketing strategy, pricing is essential to marketing performance and is the most direct driver of revenue [1]. In
online market, consumers canmake price comparisons much easier and more efficiently. Even minor
fluctuations or price disparities can have a significant impact on consumers’ shopping decisions, and in turn
influence sellers’ revenues and profitability [2,3]. The price disparities or price changes are not only visible to
consumers but also transparent to competitors. In hence sellers in online market sellers may be more
complicated to decide their pricing strategies. Although a handful studies have considered price dynamics in
online shopping situations[4], analysis on price movements and sellers’ pricing behaviorsis still a challenging
issue.
In online marketplace, consumers face more risks and uncertainties relative to traditional offline market. To
reduce such uncertainties, many online platforms rely on reputation systems to promote consumers’ trust in
transactions.Online reputation system will support consumers to identify sellers with high quality.Both
researchers and marketers agree that sellers will benefit a lot from high reputation [5,6]. For instance, many
researchers provide evidence thathigh reputation willpromote large sales volume[7]. They suggest that customers
are more willing to trade with reputable retailers which areperceived to be of high quality [8]. Many studies
suggest that consumers are willing to pay higher price to reputable sellers, however, researchers do not reach an
agreement on the impact of reputation on price. There are also many studies argue that high reputable does not
guarantee those sellers high prices, but negative prices [9].Motivated by these contradictory findings, this study
aims to explore if reputable sellers will have advantages in pricing. The majority of previous studies based on
cross-sectional data to evaluate the positive or negative effect of reputation on price. We in this study will use a
dramatically price data to make an in-depth analysis of reputation and sellers’ pricing decisions.
Our analyses are based on data from the largest online C2C market in China, Taobao.com, whichhandled
1.1 trillion yuan (more than $160 billion) in sales in 2012. On taobao.com, there are two types of sellers. One is
labeled by “Tmall” and we in this paper namethis type of sellersas “T-Mall sellers”. To open a T-Mall shop, they
must have business license issued by government and pay fees to Taobao.com including a guarantee fee and a
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yearly subscription fee, etc. The other type of sellers could be any individuals which may not have any business
license. Weregard this type of sellers as “Tao sellers”. Compared to Tao sellersT-mall sellers are regarded as high
reputation sellers, since they have business license which presents a high economic power and high quality. In this
context, we try to shed light on different pricing strategies between Tao sellers and T-Mall sellers.
In offline market, it is hard to collect all sellers’ pricing decisions. Fortunately, online platforms such as
Taobao.comprovide us an opportunity to access these data. During July 19 to Oct.12 in 2013, we collecteddaily
price information of a new product (Lenovo IdeaPad Yoga 11S) which began on sale in July. During the sample
period, the number of sellers is changing over time. We record sellers’ daily prices and price changes, and based
on that we explore if sellers with different reputation level will choose different pricing strategies.
In specific, we attemptto answer the following questions:
(1) DoTao seller and T-mall seller choose different pricing strategies when acting asa new entrant?
(2) Which type of sellers change their prices more often?
(3) Do T-Mall (or Tao) sellers adjust their prices following by the price changes of the other type of sellers?
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, wereview the previous literature of the impact of reputation
and pricing strategies.We then present results of our empirical analysis in section 3. Finally, in section 4, we
discuss our research findings.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Reputation system engenders consumers’ trust in online marketplace and itbrings positive economic
benefits to online reputable sellers [10].Ye et al. (2009)find empirical evidence that reputable sellers will obtain
high sales volume[7].Many researchers suggest reputable sellers will receive a premium price. However,
researchers do not reach an agreement on the impact of reputation on price. The majority of research on
reputation and price suggest a positive correlation between reputation and price [11,12].They argue that consumers
are willing to pay a higher price to reputable sellers [13,14], and expect to receive high-quality products and
service in turn.However, Liu et al. (2012) find a negative price premium effect[9]. They suggest a high-reputation
seller charges a lower price than a low-reputation seller.Though prior researches have investigated the impact of
reputation on price, few studies are based on dynamic pricing data. We in this paper will complementary the
existing literature by analyzing the impact of reputation on dynamic pricing decisions.
In search good market, there are mainly two alternative strategies, skimming strategy and penetration
strategy[15]. When using a skimming strategy, sellers will set higher initial prices. If a penetration strategy is used,
they will initiallyset lower prices to attract more consumers and get more sale volume. Some studies suggest
pricing strategy for a new product need take product characteristics into account[16]. If a product has higher price
sensitivity, the initial price should be lower, and in hence penetration strategy is more appropriate. Obviously
sellers takinga skimming strategy will face more risk, since they will lose those consumers that do not want to
pay higher prices. To the extent that reputable seller will receive a premium price is true, skimming strategy is
more appropriate to reputable sellers. On a contrary, penetration strategy will be a feasible strategy for
lowreputation sellers which do not have large pricing power in the market. Based on these analyses, we propose
that T-mall sellers will charge higher initial price than Tao sellers when enter into a new market, and they are
more likely to choose skimming strategy.
In competitive pricing situation, there are three strategies to be used, leader pricing, parity pricing and
low-price supplier pricing. When a seller choose parity pricing strategy, it will match price set by the market or
price leader[15]. We propose that high reputable sellers will choose leader pricing strategy, and low reputable
sellers will influenced by high-reputation sellers’ pricing behaviors and thus choose parity pricing strategy when
adjusting their prices.
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 Data collection
We developed a Java-based crawler to retrieve online data from Taobao.com, and we collected both sellers’
reputation and pricing information from July 19 to Oct.12 in 2013. The product we focused on is Lenovo
IdeaPad Yoga 11S-IFI, with 1.5-GHz Intel Core i5-3339Y processor, 4GB of RAM, 256 GB SSD Capacity, and
Intel HD Graphics 4000 GPU. The product began on sales in July 2013.
There are totally 4883 product items retrieved during entire data collection period, however, many of them
which have similar product names, are actually not selling Yoga 11S-IFI. So we made a further check and
excluded nosy data manually.Then we got our final sample which consists of 3302 valid items.There are 86 days
in the sample, for an average of 38 sellers per day.At the beginning of data collection, there are only 9 sellers in
the market, 3 T-mall sellers and 6 Tao sellers. The number of sellers increased over time, and during the sample
period, some sellers came into the market and also some sellers quitted the market before we ended our
collection. In Figure 1, we plot dynamics of the daily mean prices for the sample period. From the plots we see
that large decreases in the price occurs after 5 days, and then 12 days later the mean price increases gradually.
The prices are more dynamic at earlier stage and become stable at later.
3.2 Results
In this section, we firstly studied the pricing strategies for new entrants.Within the new product pricing
situation, we explored if sellers with different reputation levels will choose different strategies when setting their
initial prices.We then analyzed the frequency of price adjustments. We built a regression model toestimate
factors influence sellers’ price adjustments.
3.2.1 Pricing strategy for new entrants
During our data collection period, there are totally 63 new sellers arrive to the market (not including those
9 sellers which have already appeared at first day). In Figure 2the variable in vertical axis is relative price for a
new entrant.The red plots represent data in T-mall market, and the blue onesdemonstrate initial relative price of
Tao sellers. When seller i come into the market at date t, its initial relative price tip_r_new ,  is defined as its
initial price divided by the mean market price at date t.
avg_p
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Figure1.Mean prices over time
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Figure2.Relative prices for new entrants
We conducted a t-test for these two groups (Table 1), and the results indicate thatwe can accept the null
hypothesis that there is no difference in the variances between groups.Using the first method (Pooled variance
estimator) for our t-test, we canreject the null hypothesis that there are no statistically significant differences
between means. Our results revealed that the relative prices in Tao and T-mall market have different mean value
and it is higher in T-mall market (tmall=1). That is to say when a T-mall seller enters into a market as a new
entrant it will be more likely to set a higher initial price (use skimming strategy).
Table 1.T-testprocedure
(a) Statistics for variable: p_r_new
tmall N Mean Std Dev Std Err Minimum Maximum
0 45 0.9860 0.0326 0.00485 0.9277 1.0559
1 18 1.0194 0.0283 0.00668 0.9881 1.1062
Diff (1-2)  -0.0334 0.0314 0.00877
(b) T-Tests
Method Variances DF t Value Pr > |t|
Pooled Equal 61 -3.82 0.0003
Satterthwaite Unequal 35.823 -4.05 0.0003
3.2.2 Price adjustment strategy
Table 2 shows the price adjustment patterns in Tao Market and T-Mall market. Columns I, II, and III
represent the total number of price changes,frequencies ofprice increases and price decreases in the subsequent
period, respectively.
Table 2.Frequency andmagnitude ofprice changes
Group
Frequency of price changes Size of price changes
changes(I) increase(II) decrease(III) Mean(IV) StdDev(V)
Tao 57 20 37 -65.4736842 311.0506450
T-Mall 55 26 29 39.3485455 250.9686953
p_r_new
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
date
07/16/2013 08/01/2013 08/16/2013 09/01/2013 09/16/2013 10/01/2013 10/16/2013
stmall 0 1
© Equality of Variances
Method Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F
Folded F 44 17 1.32 0.5447
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From the above table we can seesellers are more often to cut down prices than raise their prices, especially in
Tao market. Though, the frequency of price increases (N = 26) was smaller than the frequency of price decreases
(N = 29), the mean value of price changes of T-Mall sellers are higher than zero. The results imply that the
magnitude of price increases is greater than the magnitude of price decreases in T-Mall market.
Then, we test if a seller’s price adjustment has significant correlation with T-Mall sellers’ price adjustments
at time t-1, Tao sellers’ price adjustments at time t-1, changes of T-mall market price at time t-1, and changes of
Tao market price at time t-1. We built the following regression model.
??
?????? ????
variablesControl
Chan_avgpChan_avgppAdjpAdjp Taolt
Mall
t
Tao
t
Mall
tti
?
????? 14131211, __
(1)
In the above equation,
tip ,? indicatesprice change of seller iattimet.
Mall
tpAdj 1_ ? =? ??
J
j
tjp 1, is the total sum of sellers’ price adjustments in T-Mall market at time t-1. Similarly,
Tao
tpAdj 1_ ? is the total sum of sellers’ price adjustments in Tao market at time t-1.
Mall
tChan_avgp 1? isthe change of T-mall market price at time t-1 which defined as T-mall market price
attimet-1 minus that at timet-2.Similarly, TaotChan_avgp 1?  is the change of Tao market price at time t-1.
Control variables:
1, ?tiDev_p = 11, ?? ? tti priceprice  , is seller i’s price deviation from market price attimet-1.
1, ?tiflag_trans =1, if seller i have sold the product at time t-1, and zerootherwise.
Mall
tChan_avgp ,
Tao
tChan_avgp  are defined similarly as
Mall
tChan_avgp 1? and
Tao
tChan_avgp 1? .
In our full sample, totally 112 sellers adjusted their prices. We divide the sample into two groups, one is
clustered by Tao sellers, and the other is grouped by T-Mall sellers.Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of
variables.
Table 3.  Sample statistics
Variable
Group1 (Tao) Group2 (T-Mall)
N Mean StdDev N Mean StdDev
tip ,? 57 -65.4736842 311.0506450 55 39.3485455 250.9686953
Mall
tpAdj 1_ ?
57 83.3861404 234.1932528 55 41.9276364 280.2058130
Tao
tpAdj 1_ ?
57 -95.0877193 275.4574300 55 -130.9454545 274.1536078
Mall
tChan_avgp 1?
57 5.0748862 38.4945328 55 -5.0691003 21.7852178
Tao
tChan_avgp 1?
57 -1.5348233 29.7912814 55 -4.4465385 29.7035721
Mall
tChan_avgp
57 -10.3350089 36.1247670 55 -8.0829396 27.7605549
Tao
tChan_avgp
57 2.2095761 35.1522540 55 2.2633319 27.3488121
1, ?tiDev_p 57 -104.2834933 237.7067618 55 -31.9906223 126.6832652
1, ?tiflag_trans 57 0.3508772 0.4814868 55 0.5272727 0.5038572
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Estimates for the coefficients are reported in Table 4.In Group 1, coefficient of MalltChan_avgp 1?  is
significant. This indicates that the magnitudes of Tao sellers’ price adjustments will be influenced by T_Mall
market price changes. The results in Group 2 show that the magnitudes of T-Mall sellers’ price adjustments will
be influenced by T_Mall market price changes and T-Mall sellers’ price adjustments at time t-1.On contrary,
coefficients of TaotpAdj 1_ ?  and
Tao
tChan_avgp 1?  are both insignificant. It shows that Tao market price changes
and Tao sellers’ price adjustment will not influence seller’ price adjustment decisions in the next day. The
significant coefficients of 1, ?tiDev_p suggest that if a seller’s price deviated much from market price at time t, it
will adjust its price to reduce the deviationin the subsequent time.
Table 4.Regression results for two groups
Variable Group1 (Tao) Group2 (T-Mall)
Coef. Std. Err. p VIF Coef. Std. Err. p VIF
Mall
tpAdj 1_ ?
-0.2740 0.1851 0.1454 1.96 0.3054** 0.1362 0.0298 2.47
Tao
tpAdj 1_ ?
0.1697 0.1292 0.1952 1.32 -0.0116 0.1092 0.9156 1.52
Mall
tChan_avgp 1? 3.2817
** 1.2583 0.0121 2.45 1.6031 1.4378 0.2706 1.66
Tao
tChan_avgp 1?
-0.5154 1.2527 0.6826 1.45 0.1129 0.9205 0.9029 1.27
Mall
tChan_avgp 3.3969
*** 1.2645 0.0099 2.18 3.6900*** 1.0220 0.0008 1.36
Tao
tChan_avgp
0.6940 1.0192 0.4992 1.34 1.6332 0.9797 0.1023 1.21
1, ?tiDev_p -0.6175
*** 0.1731 0.0008 1.77 -0.9518*** 0.2354 0.0002 1.50
1, ?tiflag_trans 2.2350 70.9021 0.9750 1.22 -123.7514
** 55.1899 0.0298 1.31
F -Value 6.62 7.57 <.0001
Adj- R2 0.4452 0.4934
*, **,***significance level of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Our results demonstrate that sellers with different reputation levels will choose different pricing strategies.
Firstly, we find that initial prices set by T-Mall sellers are statistically higher than those set by Tao sellers. That
is to say, high reputable sellers are more likely to choose skimming strategy when enter into a new market.
Secondly, our analyses find directional supportthatlow reputable sellers are more often to cut down their
prices over time, and the magnitude of price decreases are larger than that of high reputable sellers. Moreover, it
is surprising to find thatalthough the frequency of price increases is smaller than price decreases, the mean value
of magnitudes of price increases is larger than price decreases in T-Mall market.
Thirdly, we find Tao sellers’ price adjustments are influenced by T-Mall market price changes. On a
contrary, Tao sellers’ price adjustment behaviors and as well as changes of market price in Tao Market have no
significant impact on the following sellers’ price adjustment decisions.
Our study contributes to the understandings on the effects of seller reputation on pricing.However, our
study is still preliminary in analyzing their dynamic relationships.Some other factors such as market competition
still need to concern in future research.
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